Why did mattel sues aqua

R displaying Target mega-store advertisement listing Barbie Girl product among other advertisements for other music CDs. Even assuming that plaintiff's evidence supports its assertion that the parties' products are marketed in the same venues television programs, etc.

Plaintiff presents no evidence that it markets its products as music. As to the consumers each side targets, plaintiff claims that both parties target young girls. However, its earlier papers provide contradictory information about whom its primary purchasers are. See Pl. Defendants claim that they target teenagers and adults, while Mattel's products are targeted at young girls ranging from 2 or 3 to 10 or 11 years old.

See Defs. B1, at The average age was This data suggests some overlap in the demographic groups targeted by the two parties, although plaintiff does not provide clear data about the age of its purchasers, as opposed to consumers: for example, although a product may be targeted at young people, their parents may be the ones who actually purchase the dolls.

Assuming that the bounce back cards were filled out by the purchasers of the CDs, it would appear that the average age of MCA's purchasers is The relevance of the purchaser's identity is that they are they ones who may or may not be confused when confronting products with similar marks in the marketplace. The age of the average purchaser, whether a young child or an adult, can also affect the degree of care with which they purchase products. The Court notes that, assuming the bounce back cards reflect purchasers of MCA's products, the average buyer of Barbie Girl is a teenager.

In its papers, plaintiff has variously claimed that its primary purchasers are young children and adults two groups distinct from teenagers. Defendants claim that they chose the name "Barbie" not to confuse the public but rather to parody the doll and make a comment on the values it represents. Rasted Decl. As to this element, plaintiff need not show that defendants "intended to deceive consumers. The weight of this factor is somewhat diminished in the context of parody, however, as all parodists of consumer products "intend to select" the products' mark to make their comments.

See also Cliffs Notes, F. This does not mean that Henson intended to cause confusion in the minds of consumers. As noted earlier, plaintiff's "evidence" of intent include marketing documents by defendants that indicate a desire to avoid unnecessary connections to Mattel, specifically to "avoid any direct connection or conflict to Mattel.

X, at Plaintiff further alleges that the fact that the "bounce back" cards accompanying some of defendants' product are evidence of intent because the cards asked consumers if their hobbies included "collecting Barbies. However, this answer was one of nine options presented to consumers. See Newton, 22 F. Throughout this litigation, plaintiff refers to "Barbie Girl" products.

However, the only product here is one song, Barbie Girl, which is sold in different forms and is performed by a new group that will be using totally different songs in future productions. Mattel claims that it is intending to expand its own line of products to include singles, albums, and CDs bearing the Barbie trademark. However, "the intent of the prior user [of a mark] to expand or its activities in preparation to do so, unless known by prospective purchasers, does not affect the likelihood of confusion.

Plaintiff provides no evidence that consumers were aware of these expansion plans at the time the Aqua CD was first released in the United States in Likewise, plaintiff's assertions that defendants intended to market "a pink heart-shaped purse with BARBIE GIRL emblazoned on it" is irrelevant to the issue of expansion of products if consumers are unaware that the product was to be released.

Plaintiff offers no evidence that consumers were aware of this potential product. As stated above, the Court finds that the Barbie Girl song is a parody. The Supreme Court has observed that. The Court recognized the importance of these works in social discourse, even when some individuals fall to realize that they are parodies: "First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.

Nor does the fact that defendants targeted a popular trademark for parody leave their speech unprotected. See New Kids, F. As the Ninth Circuit has held, "the trademark laws do not give [plaintiffs] the right to channel their fans' enthusiasm and dollars only into items licensed or authorized by them. Defendants have produced a song that parodies plaintiffs' successful and well-known product. Censoring such parodies even ones that become profitable themselves raises serious dangers to the First Amendment.

In this case, the central issue is whether defendants can use the word "Barbie" in the title and lyrics of their song. Although some individuals inevitably will believe that titles and lyrics containing a celebrity or icon's name constitutes an endorsement, this risk "is outweighed by the danger of restricting artistic expression. The First Amendment interests at stake outweigh the possibility that some people might not interpret the song's lighthearted lyrics as a comment or spoof of the popular Mattel product and might be confused as to whether Mattel put out or authorized the song Barbie Girl.

Besides its claims regarding the use of the name "Barbie," plaintiff also asserts that defendants have misappropriated plaintiffs trade dress, specifically the use of so-called Barbie "pink" in the Barbie Girl packaging and video. Trade dress is "the appearance of the product" and includes such features as "size, shape, color, color combinations, texture, or graphics.

Banana Republic, Inc. Indeed, "[t]rade dress is the totality of elements in which a product or service is packaged or presented. These elements combine to create the whole visual image presented to customers Boney, Inc. Boney Services, Inc. To recover for trade dress infringement under 15 U. Doc's B.

Others, F. Plaintiff cannot show that its use of the color pink has acquired secondary meaning. The color pink is used on many products associated with young girls, see Folkes Decl. See Mana Products, Inc. Columbia Cosmetics, Mfg. British Seagull Ltd. Nor does plaintiff point to any evidence that its use of white lettering on a pink background is unique.

Plaintiff argues, however, that it is seeking registration for the word "Barbie" on a field of pink. See Second Am. In its application for trademark registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, plaintiff attaches an image of the word "Barbie" that has "stylized," slanted white lettering, apparently on a pink background.

This application, however, specified that plaintiff has used this mark in connection with "dolls, doll clothing and doll accessories. No mention is made of records, music, or CD products. Plaintiff offers no evidence that pink and white lettering has acquired a "secondary meaning" with consumers. Boney, F. Indeed, "a product feature whose only impact is decorative and aesthetic, with no source identifying role, cannot be given exclusive rights under trade dress law.

Although the word "Barbie" does denote the doll sold by Mattel, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the combination of pink and white are anything more than decorative colors used by Mattel and many other companies.

Even if plaintiff were correct that its pink and white trade dress were unique, significant differences exist between its packaging and that of the Barbie Girl song to prevent likelihood of confusion, at least as to trade dress. In comparing the packaging of the two products, this Court must consider the "totality of elements" involved in the packaging. Aqua's album, Aquarium, has a blue, watery background and contains yellow lettering for the eleven songs listed on the back.

In big, rounded blue letters the word "Aqua" appears at the top of the CD. None of the song's lettering is larger than the other, and in fact, pink BARBIE pink or otherwise does not appear anywhere on the front or back of the CD case.

Likewise, the cassette version of the album does not contain any pink lettering. Plaintiff's main complaint appears to be with the CD-single versions of the song. However, a review of these packages reveals several significant differences.

The words "Barbie Girl" appear in pink block lettering. These letters have irregular borders and are shadowed in dark pink and outlined in both white and dark pink. The curved, relatively thin lettering used by Mattel is quite distinct from pink block lettering used by Barbie Girl.

As mentioned earlier, Mattel offers no evidence that its use of pink or even pink and white is distinct to its products alone. Because Mattel cannot establish "the existence of an element essential" of claim i. The Act exempts from its reach the "[f]air use of a famous mark by another person in comparative advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark[;][n]oncommercial use of a mark[; and] [a]ll forms of news reporting and news commentary.

To prove dilution, a party need not show "the presence or absence of 1 competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or 2 likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech in the First Amendment context as "speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction.

As parody is a form of noncommercial, protected speech, the Act does not affect the First Amendment protection accorded to it, a proposition recognized by several supporters of the legislation. Plaintiff contends that its famous mark is associated with wholesomeness and that defendants' song tarnishes that mark through its "sexual and denigrating lyrics. In its prior papers, plaintiff has characterized Barbie Girl as supporting "promiscuity, lewdness, and the stereotyping and denigration of young women.

However, plaintiff has not shown that its mark is associated exclusively with wholesomeness. Indeed, their product itself has been accused of promoting unrealistic, sexist stereotypes of what constitutes the "ideal woman. In addition, a book copyrighted by Mattel about Barbie variously described her as a "buxom fashion queen," "a dream goddess," and "a sophisticated grown-up doll"; the book further acknowledged criticism of the doll for its unrealistic body proportions.

Even if the song did tarnish or dilute the Barbie mark, defendants' speech falls within the "noncommercial use of a mark" exception to the federal statute. As noted earlier, the fact Barbie Girl is sold for money is not dispositive as to whether the use of the mark is commercial. Virginia State Bd. New Kids, F. Bean, the court, in considering a state anti-dilution claim, found that the use of L.

Bean's trademark in a monthly adult entertainment magazine was a noncommercial use because it was parodying an actual catalog produced by the plaintiff. As the Court observed, the defendant had "not used Bean's mark to identify or market goods or services; it Likewise, in this case, defendants' use of the term "Barbie" is for the purposes of parody, rather than to sell knock-off Barbie products.

Bean Court also rejected the argument that mere association of a trademark with "unwholesome or negative context" is enough to make a trademark dilution claim. Although plaintiff characterizes the song as including sexual innuendo, such sexual but nonobscene speech is "entitled to no less protection than other forms of expression," no matter how coarse, vulgar, or distasteful it may be to some.

City of Boston, F. In addition, applying the trademark dilution law to parodies such as the song Barbie Girl raises important First Amendment questions. As the L. Bean Court observed,. This Court must be wary of applying anti-dilution statutes to permit "a trademark owner to enjoin the use of his mark in a noncommercial context" simply because they find such parodies "negative or offensive.

Because defendants' speech falls within the noncommercial use exception, this Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's trademark dilution claim. Plaintiff also brings claims against defendants under the theories of common law misappropriation claim seven and common law unjust enrichment claim nine. In California, the "doctrine of misappropriation prohibits the substantial copying of another's commercial labors even when there is no likelihood of confusion.

In Toho, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that it knew of no case "extending the misappropriation theory to trademark infringement. We believe that California courts would refuse to make such an extension.

As to unjust enrichment, defendant claims that this theory "has no support under California law and is just another attempt to sidestep the requirements of trademark law. Defendants, however, cite no case that directly holds that unjust enrichment theories cannot be applied in the trademark context. Defendants cite Lauriedale Assoc. Wilson, which held that "restitution will be denied where application of the doctrine would involve a violation or frustration of the law or opposition to public policy.

The Court specifically noted that the appellants in that case had mischaracterized their legal theory as "unjust enrichment," when in fact they were seeking restitution. The Court described unjust enrichment as "the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so. Because defendants did not infringe or dilute plaintiff's trademark and because defendants have a strong interest First Amendment interest in parodying a popular brand name, this Court does not find that defendants are required under principles of equity to make restitution to plaintiff.

Plaintiff's fifth cause of action is for unfair competition under the Paris Convention. Mattel asserts that, under 15 U. Section deals with international conventions for the protection of trademarks and commercial names. Subsection i provides that United States citizens "shall have the same benefits as are granted by this section to persons described in subsection b of this section. Subsection b , in turn, provides that. Defendants assert that no private cause of action exists under the Paris Convention.

Plaintiff responds that the "substantive provisions of unfair competition treaties, like the Paris Convention, are applicable through the Lanham Act and create a federal cause of action for unfair competition in international disputes. In this case, plaintiff is an American corporation suing both domestic and foreign defendants. In Kemart Corp. Printing Arts Research Laboratories, Inc. Eaton Co. To that end, courts have recognized that, under the Paris convention, foreign plaintiffs can "assert a federal cause of action for acts of unfair competition which occurred in the United States.

Majorca Intern. Toho Co. Santa Fe International Corp. As the Second Circuit observed,. Vanity Fair, F. Thus, the Paris Convention does not create substantive law distinct from the trademark laws of individual nations. In this case, plaintiff does not allege causes of action based on the law of England, Sweden, or Denmark the nations where the foreign defendants are citizens.

Even if it had, courts have held that "the trademark laws of a foreign country have no extraterritorial effect and cannot be asserted to support federal claims in a United States district court. Plaintiff does not have a cause of action in this Court for actions taken by foreign defendants in foreign countries.

To the extent plaintiff is attempting to apply the Convention as to the foreign defendants' acts in this country, the Convention does not create a separate cause of action distinct from those already provided under federal law. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff's fifth claim. After the filing of this case by Mattel, there were a number of published accounts of the suit that quoted various employees of both MCA and Mattel.

In numerous articles, a spokesperson for MCA noted that the album included a disclaimer saying that "the song Barbie Girl is a social commentary and was not created or approved by the makers of the doll. A Mattel employee, Sean Fitzgerald "Fitzgerald" , responded to that statement by noting "That's unacceptable It's akin to a bank robber handing a note of apology to a teller during a heist.

Neither diminishes the severity of the crime, nor does it make it legal. Barbie Girl is just a terrific pop song that's been embraced by the public. Fitzgerald responded by noting that "even if we found the lyrics acceptable, we would be filing this suit because the song was published and distributed without our permission and certainly without our notification.

They are referring to this song as upbeat and fun, and its really our belief that unlawful exploitation of another company's property for one's own commercial gain is neither upbeat or fun. It's theft. MCA filed this counterclaim for defamation based on Fitzgerald's use of the words "bank robber," "heist," "crime," and "theft" in the context of the two statements made by him regarding Mattel's suit against MCA over the Barbie Girl song. Mattel now moves for summary judgement.

This Court has previously denied Mattel's motion for summary judgement. MCA argues that Mattel should not be allowed to make this motion for reconsideration because Local Rule 7. However, at the prior hearing, the Court stated that "when we get closer to trial, we'll see whether this claim is going to go forward or not.

Since his state of mind is relevant to determining whether a claim for defamation exists, his deposition is important evidence. Therefore, the Court will reconsider its prior ruling. Under California law, "a publication must contain a false statement of fact to give rise to liability for defamation. Regents of the Univ. If the court concludes the statement could reasonably be construed as either fact or opinion, the issue should be resolved by a jury.

To determine the difference between opinion and fact, courts use a "totality of circumstances test," where the court puts itself "in the place of an average reader and decide[s] the natural and probable effect of the statement. When potentially defamatory statements are made in a context where the audience might expect the parties to persuade others to their positions by epitaphs, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, then language that might otherwise be considered fact may well be statements of opinion.

See Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. In Savage v. The judgement may, of course, be reasonable or unreasonable; but whatever quality may be attributed to it, the expressed belief in the existence of a conflict of interest does not imply an objective fact that can be proved true or false. MCA relies on the case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. In that case, the defendant published a newspaper article that claimed plaintiff "lied at the hearing after The article essentially claimed that plaintiff had committed perjury.

The court held that there is no privilege for anything that might be labeled opinion. However, this case merely sets the boundaries of federal limits to defamation suits. It does not purport to say what California law provides. The court found that the issue of whether plaintiff perjured himself could be ascertained factually under Ohio law. However, MCA must first state a claim for relief under California law, before it is necessary to determine the contours of additional federal law regarding permissible defamation actions.

Mattel relies on a post- Milkovich Ninth Circuit case, Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F. In Underwager, the defendant showed a videotape of an Australian news show in the United States at a conference that included footage of individuals disputing plaintiff's credentials and his scientific theories regarding child witnesses in sexual abuse cases.

The Ninth Circuit held that "to determine whether a statement implies a factual assertion, we examine the totality of circumstances in which it was made. First, we look at the statement in the broad context Next we turn to the specific content of the statements, analyzing the extent of figurative or hyperbolic language used and the reasonable expectations of the audience in that particular situation.

Finally, we inquire whether the statement itself is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. Even when one of the panelists accused plaintiff of "lying," the court found that such an obvious "exaggeration" did not "imply a verifiable assertion of perjury. The statement was only "nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered the appellant's position extremely unreasonable.

The public would see that the two companies were involved in a lawsuit. The public would expect a vigorous debate between both sides in the press.

Such hyperbole is protected by the First Amendment, and is not subject to a defamation suit. MCA also argues that Fitzgerald's statements amount to libel per se because he falsely accused MCA of committing a crime. MCA relies on Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.

However, Fitzgerald merely employed hyperbole in his statement, and was not seriously suggesting that MCA had committed a bank robbery. MCA further contends that Fitzgerald's comments are susceptible to being proven true or false. MCA relies on Edwards v. Hall, Cal. Fitzgerald's comments are not susceptible to be proven true or false.

The comments were made soon after the suit was filed when there was a considerable amount of press interest. The articles and news shows that covered the issue wanted to illustrate the controversy between both sides, which is why they all featured comments from Fitzgerald, as well as from MCA employees.

Thus, the comments were certainly of the type where the audience would "anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epitaphs, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole. The statements that referred to MCA as a "bank robber" that committed a "crime," "heist," or "theft" cannot be seen as anything but hyperbole made in the middle of an attempt to convince the public of Mattel's side in the ongoing litigation.

Like the comment made in Campanelli that the plaintiff had caused the players to be "beaten down and in trouble psychologically," Fitzgerald's statements are not such that they can be proven in any verifiable sense. This case is also like Savage, where defendant opined that the plaintiff was guilty of "a conflict of interest. Thus, we join with the other courts of appeal in concluding that when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represents his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment.

Bugliosi, 56 F. That is precisely the situation in this case. All of the allegedly defamatory statements were made in the context of a news story or program where both sides of the this lawsuit were present to discuss the suit. Thus, the public obviously knew that each side believed strongly in their position.

Fitzgerald's comments were all in response to statements by MCA, and he stated the background facts, such as that MCA used the "Barbie" name without permission from Mattel, before making his ultimate conclusion that such conduct was akin to theft. As such, MCA's claim for defamation is dismissed. Federal law also provides additional protection for statements made about a public figure. A plaintiff can become a public figure in one of two ways. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.

Robert Welch, Inc. Public figure plaintiffs "must show that such statements were made with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless disregard of their truth. MCA contends that it is not a public figure.

MCA relies on Vegod Corp. ABC, 25 Cal. The court held that "a person in the business world advertising his wares does not necessarily become part of an existing public controversy. It follows those assuming the role of business practice critic do not acquire the First Amendment privilege to denigrate such entrepreneur.

However, the court did note that in cases where individuals are found not to be public figures, they "never discussed the civil or criminal litigation with the press" or "[sought] publicity" on the issue. Likewise, the plaintiff in Vegod sought no publicity for running the close-out sale of a major department store.

However, MCA, a major entertainment conglomerate, sought out publicity both for its product, and about the lawsuit once it was filed. MCA engaged in a frontal assault in the news media to defend and promote the song in the face of the lawsuit. In addition, to promote the song, MCA sent out press kits on Aqua to or more media outlets.

Stein Dep. MCA also relies on La Costa v. Superior Court, which held that "merely because a corporation sells services to the public This case is distinguishable because the small corporation which ran one resort in La Costa is far different from an international conglomerate such as MCA.

In addition, MCA sought out the media to promote its album, and then to defend itself from the lawsuit. A person is not a public figure merely because he happens to be involved in a controversy that is newsworthy.

A public figure plaintiff must have undertaken some voluntary act through which he seeks to influence the resolution of the public issues involved In sum, when called upon to make a determination of public figure status, courts should look for evidence of affirmative actions by which purported public figures have thrust themselves into the forefront of particular public controversies.

Cohagan, Cal. Here, MCA has attempted to thrust itself into the forefront of the dispute with Mattel over the song. The California Supreme Court has held that "while any person or organization has the right to engage in publicity efforts and to attempt to influence public and media opinion regarding their cause, such significant, voluntary efforts to inject oneself into the public arena require that such a person or organization be classified as a public figure in any related defamation actions.

Superior Court, 37 Cal. MCA has engaged in promoting itself and its products for many years. Such efforts increased at the time of the litigation, when MCA began sending out statements to numerous press outlets.

The actual malice standard is "subjective in nature, provable only by evidence that the defendant realized his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statement. Mattel argues that MCA has provided no evidence, and certainly not clear and convincing evidence, that Fitzgerald had actual, serious doubts concerning the truth of his statements, nor that he acted recklessly in making such statements.

California law defines "actual malice" as "that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is published or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice.

The rule is premised on the recognition that judges, as expositors of the constitution, have a duty to independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgement that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of actual malice. Connaughton, U. However, ill-will is not the standard for constitutional malice. There is no evidence whatsoever, and certainly not clear and convincing evidence, that Fitzgerald or Mattel knew the statements were false.

Thus, the only way that MCA can avoid summary judgement is if they show clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard. MCA argues that Mattel acted with reckless disregard for the truth because Fitzgerald lacked knowledge about trademark or defamation law. MCA also contends that Fitzgerald himself admitted that he did not think the song was put out by Mattel when he first heard it. Finally, MCA contends that Fitzgerald acted recklessly because he had no notes with him when he made the statements to the press, and then never retracted them once they were out.

All of this evidence taken together is insufficient to show that Mattel acted with reckless disregard for the truth. At best, it shows some negligence. MCA has the burden to show clear and convincing evidence of malice. As a public figure, MCA must meet a high burden to prove its defamation claim against Mattel.

MCA has failed to do so. For the forgoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants' motion to dismiss foreign defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. To the extent plaintiff orally moved at the April 30th hearing for summary judgment on its trademark infringement claims, the Court DENIES that motion.

Plaintiff has not shown that the foreign defendants have had sufficiently continuous or systematic contacts to warrant general jurisdiction. However, the Court finds that there is no private cause of action under the Paris Convention. The term "connection," however, has multiple meanings and its use in a survey question raises issues of what respondents mean when they agree that two products are "connected.

All parodies make associations between the parody and the objects of the parody, yet that does not mean the viewers or listeners also believe that a relationship or bond exists between the maker of the parody and the maker of the object being parodied.

See Gallo, F. It also contends that there is no case in which only four percent confusion has been found to create a triable issue of fact. Cogan Supp. Cogan conducted her survey in January and February of this year were import versions. Plaintiff does not specify where in the U.

See Samuels Supp. I, at Hill ed. It further notes that Barbie, a "buxom fashion queen[,] is often a creature tortured for effect. Her head pops off, fits back on, and does a degree rotation. Simons stated that she believed "the song was just sort of a fun song about a guy and a girl on a date" and that she was not reminded of the Barbie doll when she listened to it. Healy Decl. D, at , Plaintiff fails to explain, however, how the views of this individual are relevant, when the lyrics of the song clearly poke fun at Barbie and Ken, the dolls.

This argument ignores that the song's lyrics poke fun at Barbie the doll and women like Barbie, not just "party girls" in general. For example, a September article in Billboard magazine described the song as "a quirky look at the Barbie doll and her pal Ken. The ironic humor and catchy melody comes through as the two play off each other. F1, at See also Ex.

F2 at describing the song as "a playfully naughty Euro-dance ditty on the private whims and desires of our plastic pal and her male mainstay, Ken". Other member of the press, including music reviewers, have viewed the song as critical of the doll. See, e. Folkes Decl. The lyrics of these songs often contain disparaging comments regarding the doll, some more critical or vulgar than those in Barbie Girl. For example, Lunachicks question whether Barbie would be as popular if she had a mastectomy, age spots, or varicose veins.

David Wilcox sings that Barbie "found a higher power over at Betty Ford, It was a vibrator and a ouija board. Rasted Decl, Ex. In the introduction, Jill McCorkle variously describes the doll as a "a buxom fashion queen," "a dream goddess," and "a sophisticated grownup doll, a recipient of fantasies that involved far more than motherhood.

McCorkle also notes that she "often found Barbie to be a rather controversial topic" and that she admits that she has "in recent years found myself defending Barbie" because of the doll's unrealistic body proportions. Finally, McCorkle admits that "despite popular belief, This book recognizes that the Barbie doll has different meanings to different people, not all of which are necessarily positive or wholesome. As noted earlier, even Mattel arguably has recognized, in a book put out under its copyright, that the doll has acquired multiple cultural meanings, not all of which are positive.

Forty-seven percent did not know what company was connected with the song. Cacciatore reportedly said that MCA "went with what we knew would be the impact cut [by releasing Barbie Girl as the first single in the United States], taking a part of American culture with Barbie.

By packaging the great connection with a great band, we now have this kind of phenomenon happening. The "connection" being packaged, however, is the cultural associations that the doll has and that the band was spoofing. As noted early, Barbie is a part of American culture and is subject to criticism and commentary like all cultural icons.

See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. Sandlin, F. In addition, plaintiff's claim of false designation of origin under 15 U. Murray v. As to plaintiff's claim for wrongful use of a registered mark under Cal. The law itself provides that "[a]ny person who uses or unlawfully infringes upon a [registered] mark[,] Balducci Publications, 28 F. Publications Intern. The Second Circuit has observed that the possibility of confusion over two products must be "particularly compelling" to outweigh First Amendment interests raised when titles invoke popular figures to communicate a particular message.

Are toy box and Aqua the same? So are Aqua. What does Aqua look like? Aqua color Aqua Latin for "water" is a greenish-blue color, a variation of the color cyan. The web color aqua is identical to the web color cyan, also sometimes called electric cyan, one of the three secondary colors of the RGB color model used on computer and television displays.

Who are the members of Aqua? Is Aqua still a band? In , though, Aqua embarked on a reunion tour, and in , the band released their third album of original material, called Megalomania. But the band is still at it. Who is the lead singer of Aqua? Aqua Since What language is Aqua? What genre is Barbie Girl?

Bubblegum dance. The case was a civil action brought by the toy company Mattel against the Danish band Aqua over the lyrics of the latter's pop song, Barbie Girl. The company had claimed that the use of the Barbie name and her invitation in the song to her toy-mate, Ken, to "go party" was a violation of its trademark. But the US court of appeals in San Francisco ruled yesterday that the song was protected under the band's rights to freedom of expression upheld by the first amendment.